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I. INTRODUCTION
It is an honor to be invited to contribute to this symposium for a scholar
and friend who truly merits a term I do not use lightly: mentor.1 Professor
Michael Risinger spent hours discussing some of my early articles with me,
leading to vast improvements in their expression, argumentation, and wit.
As I became a target for aggrieved forensic practitioners whose discipline I
had questioned, Michael’s and colleagues’ writings became a model for my
efforts at rebuttal through careful and methodological argumentation and,
again, the occasional touch of wit.2 Later, Michael was candid enough to tell
me when I learned that lesson perhaps too well.3
I am especially flattered that Michael invited me to contribute to this
symposium by “using my science studies chops.” Michael’s outsider’s
explication of the sociology of science using my work as an example, which
he delivered at Professor Caudill’s symposium in 2006, remains a classic
piece of writing about science studies—at least to me.4 In this passage,
* Professor, Department of Criminology, Law & Society, University of California, Irvine.
1
Two such people are retiring this year. The other is William Thompson.
2
E.g., D. Michael Risinger et al., Brave New ‘Post-Daubert World’—A Reply to
Professor Moenssens, 29 SETON HALL L. REV. 405 (1998).
3
E.g., Simon A. Cole, Don’t Shoot the Messenger By One of the Messengers: A
Response to Merlino et al., 45 TULSA L. REV. 111 (2009).
4
D. Michael Risinger, The Irrelevance, and Central Relevance, of the Boundary
Between Science and Non-Science in the Evaluation of Expert Witness Reliability, 52 VILL.
L. REV. 679, 686 (2007). Curiously, passages of this article reappeared verbatim in a redacted
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Michael used the example of fingerprint identification as an example of the
extreme relativist position often associated with science studies, and he used
my discovery of those limits and the necessity for me of distinguishing
between the limits of scientific knowledge in a strictly epistemological sense
from limits produced by the fact that this particular group of knowledgemakers had in fact failed to correctly identify the kind of studies and data
that would have supported the knowledge claims that they were making and
thus, not surprisingly failed to amass those studies and data.
What is interesting and challenging about forensic science, as
Michael’s paper illustrates, is that debates about philosophy of science are
not all that helpful in tackling what we might call “the problem” of forensic
science. When a discipline has not even framed an empirical question, there
is little need to debate the merits of relativism versus realism. Nor, I would
argue, is it helpful—as so many seem to think it is—to exhort the forensic
disciplines to fit themselves to a template called “the scientific method”
constructed around hypothesis testing. As Michael, drawing on Susan
Haack, has correctly argued, “scientific method” is more an honorific than a
universal description of every activity society conventionally calls “science.”
And yet, forensic disciplinary communities certainly do make scientific
knowledge of a sort; their claims enjoy broad social acceptance both
internally and externally. It is probably fair to say that most of these
disciplinary communities are still struggling to move forward to more
defensible knowledge claims, despite more than a decade of work by
outsiders and insiders trying to push them in this direction. How and why
these things happen, it seems to me, are sociological questions.5
(and thus, to me, anonymous) version of a letter supporting my case for promotion to
Associate Professor with tenure. When I was being considered for promotion to full
Professor, Michael dispensed with anonymity entirely. I was minding my own business one
weekend afternoon, when my mobile phone rang, and Michael barked, “It’s Michael. Your
promotion file. I agree with almost everything you say. But publication #3, footnote 26—
explain yourself.” After a lengthy discussion, we bid goodbye, and I started to tell my spouse,
“the funniest thing just happened.” At that point, my mobile phone rang again . . . .
5
David Caudill offers such a sociological contribution in this volume. David Caudill,
Toward A Sociology of Forensic Knowledge? A (Supplementary) Response to Cole, 48 SETON
HALL L. REV. 583 (2018). In this paper, Caudill adopts the perspective of one of the pioneers
of science studies, Harry Collins. Collins, somewhat notoriously, has broken with much of
the field by accusing science studies of leveling expertise in such a way as to afford the views
of “experts”—however defined—as deserving of no greater weight than laypeople. In place
of this leveled view, Collins and his collaborators offer a typology of kinds of expertise.
Working in this tradition, Caudill shows that for forensic fire analysts—but the point could
be made equally well for many forensic disciplines—the question of how they make
knowledge is more fruitfully framed around expertise than around science. And, he argues
that it is possible, and perhaps even practically necessary, to imagine a community of fire
experts who deploy scientific knowledge about the behavior of fire that was made by others
(by scientists) even though they did not, and perhaps are not even qualified to, generate that
knowledge themselves. I agree entirely with this argument. And, I share Collins’s and
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For the past eight years, I have begun my writings about forensic reform
by suggesting that the post-National Research Council (NRC) report (also
known as the “NAS Report”)6 era, beginning in 2009, is a historic moment
for American forensic science. Whether it will go down in history as a
turning point of reform or a lost opportunity, however, is still not clear.7 In
2017, it is possible to believe that this year will, when history is written,
become yet another landmark year because of the closing of the National
Commission on Forensic Science (NCFS). Note also that the forensic reform
efforts of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)
ended with the Obama Administration. Likewise, while one can hope that
the report on forensic science by the President’s Council of Advisors on
Science and Technology (PCAST) will be influential, PCAST itself is
completely in abeyance, and will be unable to act on anything, let alone on
forensic science, during the current administration, and perhaps forever.8 I
am less certain of 2017’s landmark status than of 2009’s, but it could be.

Caudill’s belief that expertise exists, that expertise is not undifferentiated, that it is important
to articulate the grounds for various expertise, and that it is useful and interesting to move
beyond the deconstruction of all knowledge claims on to the problem of how we should make
consequential decisions, despite the fundamental uncertainty of all knowledge claims. Legal
disputes are one setting where that issue is forced. And, I am flattered by both Collins’s and
Caudill’s use of my own supposed expertise about the scientific validity of fingerprint
identification—which is quite different from the expertise possessed by a forensic practitioner
(like Andrew Sulner, see this volume)—as an example of their theory of expertise. But, I will
say that I still think today upon reading Caudill’s paper—that a typology of tasks is a more
useful way of parsing out the intersecting knowledge claims surrounding forensic science than
a typology of expertise. Put simply, designing and performing a scientific study to test a
forensic knowledge claim about the behavior of fire is quite a different task from forming an
opinion about the origin of a fire in a particular case. And, consuming, understanding,
evaluating, and interpreting such a study is a different task still. So, for these reasons, I have
always found it more helpful in forensic science to think about tasks than about expertises.
Space precludes me from saying much more about this, except to note that task is, of course,
a “Risingerian” word—a concept central to major contribution to the body of scholarship on
Daubert and Kumho Tire.
6
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIENCES, STRENGTHENING
FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD (2009), https://www.ncjrs.
gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/228091.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVV2-6CTZ] [hereinafter NRC
REPORT]. For the definitive account of how to describe that report, see D. Michael Risinger,
The NAS/NRC Report on Forensic Science: A Path Forward Fraught with Pitfalls, 2010
UTAH L. REV. 225, 225 n.2 (2010).
7
I do not, of course, mean that forensic reform actually began in 2009. It began, in
many ways, years, even decades before that. I mean, rather, that it gained significant
prominence and momentum with the publication of the NRC Report. I am suggesting that a
historian of forensic science writing 50 or 100 years hence might well see 2009 as a particular
important date.
8
PRESIDENT’S COUNCIL OF ADVISORS ON SCI. & TECH., FORENSIC SCIENCE IN CRIMINAL
COURTS: ENSURING SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF FEATURE-COMPARISON METHODS (2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/PCAST/pcast_foren
sic_science_report_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/EKZ3-FRA6].
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One possible reading for future historians of American forensic science
will, of course, be to read 2017 as the beginning of the end of the historic
period of forensic reform, which began in 2009. Most disturbing in this
regard is the undisguised glee with which interest groups resistant to forensic
reform, such as the National District Attorneys Association, greeted the
news, which suggests that, contrary to prosecutors’ earlier expressions of
eagerness to work with other stakeholders on forensic reform, they were in
fact simply waiting the NCFS out.9 On the other hand, it is also possible to
read the closing of the NCFS as a mere bump in the road toward forensic
reform. Perhaps enough momentum has been built up to move forward. I
do not pretend to be able to know at this point which reading is more correct.
If momentum has been built up, then where will forensic reform come
from? Presumably it may come from the disciplines themselves, from
institutions like the American Academy of Forensic Science (AAFS), the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, state forensic science commissions, the
innocence movement, Europe, etc. None of these entities, however, has the
type of broad official remit over all of American forensic science that the
NCFS had. There is only one entity remaining with that broad remit: the
Organization of Scientific Area Committees (OSAC) administered by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST).
In this sense, in 2017, OSAC suddenly became the last organization
standing of the forensic reform effort that gained significant momentum
from the NRC in 2009. One thing that is curious about this is that OSAC
does not, at first glance, seem to have a mandate to reform all of forensic
science. OSAC has a rather limited mandate centered around standards. To
be sure, the absence of standards has long been considered one of the
weaknesses of American forensic science, which many scholars and the
NRC report have mentioned prominently. But the absence of standards is
hardly the only problem with contemporary American forensic science, and,
arguably, it is not the most important or most interesting problem. A brief
survey of general problems with American forensic science might, in
addition to standards, include:



Forensic science is inadequately resourced by governments to
do what is asked of it.
Forensic science is insufficiently connected to “mainstream”
science or “national science assets.”

9
Spencer S. Hsu, Sessions Orders Justice Department to End Forensic Science
Commission, Suspend Review Policy, WASH. POST (Apr. 10, 2017), https://www.washington
post.com/local/public-safety/sessions-orders-justice-dept-to-end-forensic-science-commissi
on-suspend-review-policy/2017/04/10/2dada0ca-1c96-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html
?utm_term=.0f9299da7163 [https://perma.cc/WP75-53Y9].
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Forensic science testimony and reporting often invokes logical
fallacies (e.g., “the prosecutor’s fallacy”).
Forensic science testimony and reporting often over-claims—
that is, overstates the probative value of the evidence.
Many forensic techniques have not been validated.
Forensic protocols fail to adopt procedures for minimizing
confirmation bias that are well established in other areas of
science.
Most forensic laboratories are controlled by law enforcement
agencies. This arguably creates potential pro-government bias
and interferes with forensic scientists’ allegiance to “science.”
Insufficient basic research is carried out in forensic science.
The system of self-regulation that governs most of forensic
science is insufficiently rigorous. Certification of analysts and
accreditation of laboratories are insufficiently rigorous, not
mandatory, and controlled by the profession itself to an
inappropriate degree.
Education and training in forensic science are insufficient.
Many laboratories’ protocols and quality assurance/ control
mechanisms are insufficiently rigorous.
Forensic science lacks a sense of intellectual curiosity that
would prompt research into answering basic empirical
questions about the performance of various assays.
Forensic science does not embody a sufficient commitment to
the spirit of open inquiry to justify its self-conceptualization as
“science.”
The defensiveness and hostility of forensic science to
exogenous criticism and efforts at partnership from academia
is inconsistent with its self-conceptualization as “science.”10

If I had to choose the most important of these, I would probably pick
“validation” rather than “standards.” “Standards” is only one of the four or
five or nine11 prongs of the Daubert legal standard for scientific evidence.
And, again, it is arguably not the most important one; the most important one

10
Simon A. Cole, The Innocence Crisis and Forensic Science Reform, in WRONGFUL
CONVICTION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFORM 167–68 (Marvin Zalman & Julia Carrano eds.,
2014).
11
For a description of the many ways one can characterize the number of “Daubert
factors,” see Mark P. Denbeaux & D. Michael Risinger, Kumho Tire and Expert Reliability:
How the Question You Ask Gives the Answer You Get, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 15, 32 n.64
(2003).
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may well be “validation,” or, as it is called in Daubert, “testing.”12
The focus on standards is, of course, a consequence of the choice of
NIST as the scientific agency to co-coordinate the forensic reform effort with
the Department of Justice (DOJ). This choice itself, as is well known, came
after the NRC considered and rejected a number of federal scientific
agencies, such as the National Science Foundation, to spearhead the forensic
reform effort. The NRC ended up advocating that an entirely new agency be
created.13 The NRC also explicitly recommended against locating the
forensic reform effort in the DOJ, a recommendation that was, crucially,
rejected in the formation of the NCFS.
By the time it became clear that the NRC’s envisioned new forensic
scientific agency was not going to be created, and that the DOJ was going to
be heavily involved in the forensic reform effort, the splitting of
responsibility between the DOJ and NIST had begun to seem to forensic
reformers as perhaps the best deal that could be had. The NCFS was, at least,
not completely controlled by the DOJ. And NIST was a respected agency
that was viewed as having a true scientific orientation—that is, an orientation
around scientific truth and knowledge. NIST, of course, also had some
historic and contemporary involvement both in forensic science and in
cognate areas like biometrics.14
Despite its scientific credentials, there were some oddities about NIST
as the lead scientific agency for forensic science. The chief one, which
became clear as work began, was NIST’s understandable insistence on
sticking to its mission as an agency oriented toward the production of
standards.15 NIST did not have a broad mandate to engage in the production
of knowledge in the service of the justice system, if it was not connected to
standards. The area in which this issue most clearly manifested itself was in
the area of validation. Some scholars and members of the NCFS objected to
the logic of creating standards for disciplines, assays, or procedures, which
had not yet been validated. What was the point of creating standards for
something that was not validated? Surely, validation should come first. But
come from where? Who would do this validation, and who could create the
incentive structure for validation to get done? This, of course, brought us
back to the question of why validation had not been done in the first place.
12

Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of “Appropriate Validation” in Daubert v.
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Interpreted in Light of the Broader Rationalist Tradition,
Not the Narrow Scientific Tradition, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 735, 735–38 (2003).
13
NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
14
Rich Press, Who Was Detective X?, NIST (Feb. 9, 2017), https://www.nist.gov/feat
ured-stories/who-was-detective-x [https://perma.cc/P2VT-EFD5].
15
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., NIST Mission, Vision, Core Competencies, and Core
Values (July 10, 2009), https://www.nist.gov/about-nist/our-organization/mission-visionvalues [https://perma.cc/8U2K-B8XC] (updated Jan. 26, 2017).

COLE (DO NOT DELETE)

4/28/2018 1:14 PM

2018] WHO WILL REGULATE AMERICAN FORENSIC SCIENCE

569

Historically, there has been little incentive structure for validation in
American forensic science. Instead, there has been a disincentive for
conducting validation studies owing to the permissiveness of the legal
regime toward extreme scientific claims that could be made without
validation. NIST was reluctant to take on the mission of validating all
forensic disciplines, assays, and procedures. Instead, NIST was willing to
perform some validation research and to serve as a central evaluator for the
justice system of such research, which might be performed by others.16
So have we ended up at a point where, of all the problems with forensic
science that have been identified, for historically contingent reasons, only
the problem of “standards” will be dealt with? That, of course, is probably
not the case. It is probably not the case because, as the emerging “sociology
of standards” has pointed out, standard setting can be viewed as a form of
regulation by other means. In this sense, by creating standards, OSAC can,
in theory, regulate all or nearly all of American forensic science. Nearly
everything can be covered by standards.
In this sense, we might view the impending period of standard-setting
as a stage in the historical effort to regulate American forensic science.
Therefore, it is perhaps helpful to review that history. It is, however, also
perhaps helpful to consider the unique obstacles to regulation of forensic
science, as opposed to other forms of science. I have argued elsewhere that
many of the self-regulatory features thought to apply to science seem less
applicable to forensic science.17 Science, especially academic science, is
generally thought to operate under a prestige economy in which reputation
matters more than money.18 To be sure, this claim is both oversimplified and
dated. Even so, there remains something to it. Implicit threats to reputation
are assumed to deter wrongdoing, such as scientific fraud and even just bad
science.
Few forensic scientists live in this prestige economy in which
reputational rewards are allocated in the form of citations for prestigious
scientific publications. Rather, they operate in a much more bureaucratic
structure within police organizational hierarchies with productivity

16

Nat’l Comm. on Forensic Sci., Recommendation to the Attorney General, Technical
Merit Evaluation of Forensic Science Methods and Practices (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/page/file/905541/download [https://perma.cc/2RW5FXHN] (recommending “NIST’s evaluation may include but is not limited to: a) research
performed by other agencies and laboratories, b) its own intramural research program, or c)
research studies documented in already published scientific literature.”).
17
Simon A. Cole, Forensic Culture as Epistemic Culture: The Sociology of Forensic
Science, 44 STUD. IN HIST. & PHIL. OF BIOLOGICAL & BIOMEDICAL SCI. 36 (2013).
18
See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE SOCIAL
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS 187–230 (1979); M.J. Mulkay, Geoffrey N. Gilbert &
Steve Woolgar, Problem Areas and Research Networks in Science, 9 SOC. 187, 195 (1975).
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requirements.19 Their products are not scientific paper, but reports, which
are not cited, but merely consumed and then discarded by the criminal justice
system. These reports are not shared with peers in the conventional sense,
and they rarely, if ever, generate reputational rewards for their authors. This
situation means that the regulation of forensic science cannot come about
merely through what is often called “scientific culture.” It needs to come
from elsewhere: perhaps from the bureaucratic structure itself, perhaps from
governments, perhaps from the consumers of the evidence.
A. Self-Regulation
Forensic disciplines have called for governments to regulate them since
the early twentieth century.20 These calls have been unsuccessful.21
American governments have showed little interest in regulating forensic
science, leading to the oft-remarked situation that hairdressing and pet food
production are more rigorously regulated by government than forensic
science.
Part of the reason for this disinterest was that governments tend not to
regulate professionals. They tend to self-regulate. This eventually became
clear to the forensic community, generating calls for self-regulation, again
as early as the 1920s and 1930s. The general consensus, however, is that
forensic organizations, both the discipline-specific ones and the broader
ones, such as the American Academy of Forensic Science and the American
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors, did a poor job of self-regulation.22
B. Legal Regulation
Courts can play a role in regulating forensic science. Courts are, in
some sense, the leading, or perhaps sole, consumers of most forensic science.
This gives them great market power over forensic science, should they
choose to use it. This power could be exerted through legal opinions
establishing various requirements for forensic science to be used in trials and
other legal proceedings. Such requirements would presumably be highly
influential over forensic science, given the understanding that the criminal
proceeding is in some sense the hypothetical telos of all forensic evidence,
19
See generally Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Policing the Homeless in Montreal: Is this Really
What the Population Wants?, 20 POLICING & SOC. 432, 451 (2010).
20
For fingerprints, see SIMON A. COLE, SUSPECT IDENTITIES: A HISTORY OF
FINGERPRINTING AND CRIMINAL IDENTIFICATION 210–11 (2001) (discussing efforts to regulate
fingerprint identification in the 1930s).
21
See generally Paul Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and Forensic Science: The Need
to Regulate Crime Labs, N.C. L. REV. 86, 163–235 (2007).
22
Id. at 235 (“Paradoxically, the most scientifically sound procedure—DNA analysis—
is the most extensively regulated, while many forensic techniques with questionable scientific
pedigrees go completely unregulated.”).
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whether the forensic evidence is actually used in that criminal proceeding or
not.23
Courts have done very little to use this market power to regulate
forensic science. Indeed, quite the opposite; courts have largely allowed
forensic science to remain unregulated and even provided disincentives to
regulate. This is arguably the principal message of the NRC report, in its
perhaps most famous line, that many forensic disciplines remain invalidated
and courts have been “utterly ineffective” in regulating these disciplines.24
Interestingly, a recent discussion paper describing “Potential Concepts
for OSAC 2.0” included, among four potential concepts, a “Federal/State/
Local Partnership” concept.25 This concept consists essentially of legal
regulation. OSAC would abandon the writing of standards and shift its focus
to the writing of model legislation. The contemplated reforms of forensic
science would be promulgated because they are required by law, not because
they are “standard.” Adoption of this concept would signify an embrace of
legal regulation, although the mechanism would be legislative rather than
judicial.
C. Government Regulation
In the absence of effective self- or legal regulation, thoughts turn once
again toward government regulation. This was the solution to the ills of
forensic science the NRC proposed in 2009: a standalone federal agency
dedicated to regulating forensic science in all aspects.26 It is also the solution
adopted in the United Kingdom, which has a position called, literally, the
Forensic Science Regulator.
The NCFS, as noted above, was the government’s effort towards
government regulation of forensic science. It was, of course, not the agency
envisioned by the NRC: it was not permanent, it had no enforcement
authority, and it was controlled by law enforcement rather than independent
entities. Despite all this, it was the most ambitious effort at government
regulation of forensic science in American history.
Now, it has been closed by a change in presidential administration.27 In
a bizarre way, the otherwise reactionary comments on the PCAST report by
The American Congress of Forensic Science Laboratories (ACFSL)—an
23

William C. Thompson, The National Research Council’s Plan to Strengthen Forensic
Science: Does the Path Ahead Run Through the Courts?, 50 JURIMETRICS J. 35, 51 (2009).
24
NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 109.
25
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., Potential Concepts for OSAC 2.0 (2017),
https://www.nist.gov/topics/forensic-science/potential-concepts-osac-20
[https://perma.cc/X549-NL6Z].
26
See NRC REPORT, supra note 6, at 19.
27
See Hsu, supra note 9.
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organization subtitled “The United States Assembly of Forensic Science
Laboratory Professionals” which, despite the grandiose name, is not a
particularly well-established or representative forensic organization but
rather a more self-appointed group—have proven to be remarkably
prescient:
Interestingly, the PCAST report comes during a presidential
administration that has demonstrated a deep sensitivity to the
needs and demands of trial attorneys, criminal defendants, and
advocates of sweeping criminal justice reform.
Future
administrations may take a different approach, tending to
champion positions traditionally held by police and prosecutors.
We have no opinion in these matters. But these swings in
ideological perspective cause commensurate changes in how
forensic science and its role in our criminal justice system are
perceived. In the current political climate, forensic science is
looked upon with far more suspicion and, in some cases, distain
than would be the case in other political circumstances. And
because forensic science is both expected and apt to remain
independent of these political currents, it is vulnerable to being
misportrayed and even bullied in a way that compromises its
occupational stability. To truly strengthen forensic science,
therefore, it will be necessary to somehow insulate it from the
turbulence caused by changes in political winds. PCAST did no
favors in this regard.28
Thus, the ACFSL blunted the key asset of PCAST’s intervention into
forensic science. Unlike commissions composed by stakeholders, like
NCFS, the NRC committee, and, to a lesser extent, OSAC, PCAST is a
purely scientific body with extremely strong credentials in what
conventionally counts as “scientific prestige.” It intervened in a controversy,
in which it was widely alleged that science had become politicized, primarily
through the forensic scientists’ excessive orientation toward law
enforcement. ACFSL adopted the now-familiar perversion of relativist
sociology of science—that all science is “mere” politics, and, therefore,
equally undeserving of trust—to cast PCAST as a political body and lawenforcement-employed forensic scientists as politically neutral. This
argument turns the ideal that we go to governmental or quasi-governmental
bodies for politically neutral scientific advice on its head.29 This then, leads
28

Am. Congress of Forensic Sci. Labs., The 2016 PCAST Report, Position Statement,
(Sept. 21, 2016).
29
See, e.g., STEPHEN HILGARTNER, SCIENCE ON STAGE: EXPERT ADVICE AS PUBLIC
DRAMA (2000); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS
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to the absurd argument that no government-sponsored scientific advice
should ever be heeded because such advice is purportedly endlessly subject
to revision through elections. Forensic science should be left autonomous,
immune to any intervention from any government-associated scientific
advice. This was a laughable argument until Election Day 2016 at which
point it suddenly, unexpectedly became devastatingly prescient.
II. HISTORY OF AMERICAN FORENSIC SCIENCE STANDARDS
Given the obstacles along all the other routes toward regulation of
forensic science, it is tempting to think of standard-setting as a plausible
means of regulating forensic science. This is not unreasonable. In many
other settings, standards have served as alternatives to regulation by states,
organizations, or social conventions.30 Can standards regulate forensic
science? In order to answer this question, we will first turn to a brief history
of standards in American forensic science and then turn to what the emergent
sociology of standards and standardization might have to say about that
question.31
As of the late 1980s, with perhaps one minor exception,32 there were no
specifically “forensic science” standards promulgated by any recognized
standards development organization in the United States. Indeed, each
laboratory or practitioner was free to adhere to whatever practices might
appeal to them, based on whatever were regarded as standard textbooks or
authorities in any individual field. The state of the profession in regard to
standards relating to validity and standard practice to ensure accuracy is well
described in Peterson et al. (1989).33 However, this was about to change.
In the late 1980s, there was an increase in the criticism of various
forensic disciplines based on lack of standard practices and validation from
both inside and outside forensic science.34 Whether this was the spur is hard
(1990).

30
Stefan Timmermans & Steven Epstein, A World of Standards But Not a Standard
World: Toward a Sociology of Standards and Standardization, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 69, 71
(2010).
31
Id.
32
There was an early run at creating a standard-setting effort in the early 1970s, and in
fact a committee of the American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM), Committee E30 on forensic science, was established on the request of members of the forensic science
community in 1970, but it apparently remained virtually inactive. Committee E-30 had
nominal subcommittees, including E-30-02 on document examination. The first and only
standard promulgated by E-30 before the 1990s was E444: Standard Descriptions of Scope of
Work Relating to Forensic Document Examiners (1972).
33
Joseph L. Peterson & John E. Murdock, Forensic Science Ethics: Developing an
Integrated System of Support and Enforcement, 34 J. FORENSIC SCI. 749 (1989).
34
See, e.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 109 (1991), http://jolt.law.harvard.edu/assets/articlePDFs/v04/04HarvJLTech1
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to establish specifically, but for whatever reason, members of the forensic
science community reached out to the American Society for Testing and
Materials (ASTM, now ASTM International) in order to initiate an effective
standards effort in regard to at least some parts of forensic science35 ASTM
was the oldest and largest “standards developing organization” (SDO) for
consensus standards in the United States, and one of the oldest in the world.
Its standards for industrial materials and processes were widely used and
respected. Apparently (I say apparently because the specifics of this are hard
to run down), anyone who appeared to be involved in a respectable enterprise
in need of standards could join the ASTM and precipitate the formation of a
committee to generate such standards. I say “respectable enterprise” because
it is not clear that a group of astrologers seeking standards generated through
the ASTM consensus process would have been allowed to form a committee,
but it is not clear that they would not have been allowed to, or what criteria
were in place to distinguish between enterprises like astrology and those who
would be allowed to join and form a committee.
At any rate, in 1989, the ASTM was approached by members of the
forensic science community who were then allowed to reorganize and
rejuvenate the non-functioning ASTM committee E-3036 on forensic science
as a functioning standards committee. It is clear that one of the main movers
of this effort was John Lentini, who saw advantages in the process both for
promulgation and standardization of more valid procedures, and also for
raising the status of those performing the procedures. In explaining this,
Lentini wrote in 1995:
The impetus for standardization comes from several directions.
Laboratories seeking accreditation can refer to Standard Test
Methods for their written procedures, rather than re-inventing the
wheel. Bodies that administer examinations for certification of
individuals can have a body of knowledge from which to draw
their examination materials.
And, competent individuals
performing valid tests will have an authoritative source to lend
credibility to their conclusions, and to question the credibility of
improper or invalid methodology.37
Lentini’s influence on the early product of E-30 is clear. Lentini is one
of the leading fire investigators in the world and was a leader in bringing

09.pdf [https://perma.cc/5C3A-PC9D].
35
John J. Lentini, ASTM Standards for Forensic Sciences, 40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 146, 146
(1995).
36
Peterson & Murdock, supra note 33.
37
Lentini, supra note 35, at 146.
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more scientific approaches to the field even then. More than a third of the
first twenty standards promulgated by committee E-30 and its
subcommittees38 by 1995 dealt with fire investigation. The source of those
standards, as Lentini indicates in his article,39 were standards put forth in
1988 by the International Association of Arson Investigators (IAAI), of
which Lentini was a member. The IAAI was not a standards development
organization, and the advantages of obtaining ASTM status and blessing for
their product were obvious.
It is of some interest that an early adopter of the rejuvenated ASTM
process for setting standards was forensic document examination.40 Perhaps
it was because there was a forensic document examination subcommittee in
the original non-functioning ASTM E-30. Perhaps it was because forensic
document examination came under significant criticism for weak validation
in the late 1980s,41 and the attraction of having “an authoritative source to
lend credibility to their conclusions” in Lentini’s words, was not lost on the
practitioners of that discipline.
At any rate, upon reflection, it seems that a consensus standards
promulgation process as it is normally conceived did not fit the context of
forensic science very well, and certainly not as the ASTM E-30 and its
subcommittees functioned in the 1990s, and even beyond. In most standardsetting processes, the overarching assumption is that they are best when
emerging from a process where representatives of all “stakeholders” are
assembled in a group and must dicker over the contours of the standard in
issue. This approach assumes that there will be a variety of interested parties
involved in the process, some of whom would benefit from laxer standards,
and some from stricter standards, but all of whom have an interest in some
standard emerging to establishing a baseline for the practice of the mutually
dependent enterprises of the stakeholders.42 The members of these forensic
38
At the time of Lenitini’s article, there were three area subcommittees of E-30;
Criminalistics (E-30-01), Document Examination (E-30-02) and forensic engineering (E-3003). Id. at 146–47.
39
Id. at 146.
40
Andrew Sulner, Critical Issues Affecting the Reliability and Admissibility of
Handwriting Identification Opinion Evidence—How They Have Been Addressed (or Not)
Since the 2009 NAS Report, and How They Should Be Addressed Going Forward: A
Document Examiner Tells All, 48 SETON HALL L. REV. 631 (2018) (“The FDE community has
been more active than any other forensic discipline in producing professional standards,
having published an array of twenty-one standards through ASTM International, a private
consensus standards development organization (SDO).”).
41
D. Michael Risinger et al., Exorcism of Ignorance as a Proxy for Rational Knowledge:
The Lessons of Handwriting Identification ‘Expertise,’ 137 U. PA. L. REV. 731 (1989).
42
This is best illustrated, perhaps, by a simple example involving standards for the
tensile strength of iron bars used to reinforce concrete (“rebar”). Manufacturers of such bars
have an interest in a lower standard, and, therefore, an easier-to-produce and cheaper product.
Immediate “consumers” who produce reinforced concrete works of various sorts have an
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subcommittees might have some conflicting interests (government employed
practitioners vs. private practitioners, for instance), but they were all
members of the same guild group with group commitment to the general
validity of the enterprise as practiced by the best practitioners. Absent were
representatives of the consumers of their product (the courts and the criminal
defendants who were the ultimate parties forced to consume the product), or
of the general public interest, or of neutral scientists who were committed to
the notion of validity generally.
As the ASTM process proceeded through the mid-1990s, two major
events impacted the state of play. One was, of course, Daubert and its
progeny. The other was the Justice Department’s/FBI’s response to
Daubert, and also to the weaknesses in the FBI laboratory revealed by the
Inspector General’s report on the explosives testimony in the first World
Trade Center bombing.43 That response was to establish “technical working
groups” (TWGs) in virtually every forensic area to propose improvements to
practice (or to bless current practice, depending on your perspective). This
effort got started in 1995, and by the time the name of these bodies was
changed from TWGs to “scientific working groups” (SWGs) in 1998 (in
what appeared to some a cold-blooded public relations gambit), the main
action in most areas had moved from the ASTM to the SWGs. The
membership in ASTM subcommittees was essentially voluntary and open,
but the membership in the SWGs was controlled by the FBI and dominated
by practitioners from government labs, and was thus even less representative
than the ASTM subcommittees. SWG products might be high quality, but
an SWG was not an SDO, so its products did not result in anything but a
more or less respected opinion by the SWG. At some point the SWG
products were sometimes subject to attempts to run them through “standards
developing organizations” (SDOs) like ASTM, but not always. In any event,
all of the loci of professional and standards-developing reflection upon
interest in higher standards as long as the standards are not so demanding as to drive up the
prices to a point of diminishing demand, and therefore profits. Consumers of the product of
the reinforced concrete industry may have an interest in even stronger standards for ensuring
the longevity, and sometimes the safety, of the products they acquire (concrete roadbeds, precast concrete members in the construction of bridges or buildings, etc.). The public interest
may be represented by various government entities who are themselves consumers of the
product for public works. The assumption of the “consensus standard” standard setting
process is that if you get a properly selected and balanced representation of all stakeholders,
and therefore all competing interests, into a room (literally or virtually) over a long enough
period of time, a standard will emerge that will appropriately take into account and balance
all interests. It is further assumed that this standard will thereafter become formally binding
in specific circumstances by being incorporated into contracts, and indeed, become more
generally binding by becoming industry practice, and therefore being available to courts to
resolve various disputes in litigation even when not specifically referenced in a contract.
43
See generally JOHN F. KELLY & PHILLIP K. WEARNE, TAINTING EVIDENCE: INSIDE THE
SCANDALS AT THE FBI CRIME LAB (1998).
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various forensic science areas and techniques were concentrated among
forensic science practitioners until the coming of the NAS committee in 2006
and the issuance of their report in 2009.
A. Standards as Regulation
Can we optimistically hope that standard-setting, in the form of OSAC,
can make significant progress toward the reform of American forensic
science? The sociology of standards and standardization gives reasons for
both pessimism and optimism.
One thing that the sociology of standards makes clear is that standardsetting is far from a uniform activity. Standard-setting takes many forms,
sets out with a variety of goals, and follows contingent pathways.44
Not all standardization is aimed at reform. The goals of standardization
can range from aspirational to reflecting the status quo: “standards can imply
a lowest common denominator of available options, the power of the
strongest party in standardization, a negotiated order among some or all
stakeholders, or a confirmation of how things are done by most parties.”45 A
key question that has emerged already is whether the OSAC standards should
be aspirational—should articulate where we want forensic science
eventually to be—or should reflect the status quo. It has already become
clear that, while forensic reformers may assume that OSAC standards should
be aspirational, others believe they should reflect the current practice.
B. Committee Composition
Sociologies of standards note, not surprisingly, that the composition of
committees can affect the outcome of standardization activities.
“Standardization by committee leads to compromises, bitterly contested
power plays, and negotiations . . . [s]imilarly, a strong personality can
influence the creation of standards,” and, “[t]he composition of standard
committees inevitably creates an institutional bias.”46 The composition of
committees has already emerged as an issue for OSAC. The process began
with a clear quota system for assembling committees: 70% practitioners,
20% researchers, and 10% “R&D partners,” which presumably means
industry.47 Already, this might be thought to heavily favor practitioners who
may be oriented toward the aforementioned status quo. For example,
44

Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 70.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.
46
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 77.
47
Org. for Scientific Area Comms. (OSAC) for Forensic Sci., Terms of Reference for the
Scientific Area Committee (SAC) Subcommittees, Version 1.3 (Jan. 18, 2017),
https://workspace.forensicosac.org/higherlogic/ws/public/download/7797/FSSB_OSAC%20
ToR%20SAC%20SC_V1.3.pdf [https://perma.cc/C38B-WRLS].
45
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PCAST commented: “OSAC’s membership includes relatively few
independent scientists: it is dominated by forensic professionals, who make
up more than two thirds of its members . . . PCAST concludes that OSAC
lacks sufficient independent scientific expertise and oversight to overcome
the serious flaws in forensic science.”48 However, there is also some
evidence that some of the subcommittees had not even followed the quota
system in their composition. This may have skewed subcommittees even
further toward practitioners.49 Similar complaints have been made about the
composition of the American of Academy of Forensic Science Standards
Board (ASB) Consensus Bodies, which comprise the SDOs for OSAC.50
The ASB uses a more differentiated set of occupational categories
called “Interest Categories”:









User/Government
User/Industry
Producers
Laboratories and/or Testing Facilities
Consumer Groups
Academia
Subject Matter Experts
General Interest51

This list certainly seems to reflect a more generic understanding of a
properly composed standardization committee than OSAC’s, which seems
specifically directed at forensic science. The ASB procedures do not specify
quotas for each interest group, but rather state that no interest group should
have more than one third of the members of the body.52
48

President’s Council of Advisors on Sci. & Tech., supra note 8, at 126.
The two DNA subcommittees show that the “DNA2” subcommittee does indeed have
20% researchers, but the “DNA1” subcommittee has only three (15%) academic researchers,
as well as three current or former practitioners who are classified as researchers in part. John
M. Butler, The National Commission on Forensic Science and the Organization of Scientific
Area Committees, Address at Proceedings of the International Symposium on Human
Identification (2014). In 2014, I complained to the Pattern Evidence Scientific Area
Committee that they had not even followed the quota system in the composition of the
subcommittee in which I had the greatest interest: the Friction Ridge Subcommittee. The
result of this misallocation was that the friction ridge OSAC had even fewer academic
credentials than the friction ridge SWG, SWGFAST. And, recall that, as noted above, the
SWGs were even less representative than the ASTM committees.
50
Letter from Andrew Sulner, Principal Owner, Forensic Document Examinations, LLC
to Steve Orthey (July 14, 2009) (on file with the author).
51
See AAFS Standards Bd., ASB Interest Categories (2017), https://asb.aafs.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/07/Interest_Categories2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/JL4H-Y7UE].
52
Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Procedures for the Development of American National
49
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A quick glance at the available openings on all the Consensus Bodies
shows that Consumer Groups is the most under-filled interest category,
followed by Producers.53 This raises the interesting question of who a
“consumer” of forensic science is. The official definition is: “[g]roups,
individuals, and organizations representing consumer interests including
safety, health, and environment. ‘Consumer’ may also be interpreted to
include any party in judicial proceedings that may include forensic
evidence.”54
Some Consumer Group slots are filled by prosecutors. It is reasonable,
and arguably correct, to describe prosecutors (and judges) as “consumers” of
forensic science. More broadly, the definition might also include defense
attorneys, innocence advocates, crime victims, or victims of erroneous
forensic evidence, and perhaps even journalists.
Interestingly, one of the other “Potential Concepts for OSAC 2.0”
directly addresses the issue of committee composition. The title of this
concept, “Community-based standards,” sounds at first as if it is intended to
root standards even more deeply into the practitioner community.55 But a
closer look reveals that this concept proposes to replace the current structure,
which combines stakeholders on committees and subcommittees (although
in such a way that practitioners have a supermajority), with a structure in
which stakeholders are segregated into different committees. Specifically,
practitioners would populate the Scientific Area Committees (SACs), and
“scientists” would populate the Forensic Science Standards Board (FSSB).
This proposal perhaps reflects disenchantment with the idea that bringing
stakeholders together will stimulate progress. It perhaps suggests that some
believe that practitioners and “scientists” are far enough apart in orientation
that they need to perform separate tasks.
It is also worth noting that, given the fanfare surrounding the launch of
OSAC, a rather formidable hierarchy of committees and subcommittees
populated by more than 500 individuals total, many (myself included) were
surprised to learn that OSAC was not going to create standards. This, as it
turns out, is a consequence of the fact that NIST, despite its name, is not
itself a standard-setting organization. The OSACs, in turn, are not what are
called in the trade SDOs. So, an appropriate SDO was sought and found in
Standards, at 2 (2016), https://asb.aafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/ASB-Procedures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DZT3-PPEY].
53
AAFS Standards Bd., Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., Proceedings of the American
Academy of Forensic Sciences, 68th Annual Scientific Meeting (2016), https://asb.aafs.org/
consensus-bodies/ [https://perma.cc/V3WF-RK5E].
54
AAFS Standards Bd., Am. Acad. of Forensic Sci., ASB Interest Categories (2016),
https://asb.aafs.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/ASB-Interest-Cagegories.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2HLT-SCF7].
55
Nat’l Inst. of Standards & Tech., supra note 25.
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the American Academy of Forensic Sciences Academy Standards Board
(ASB). And so, the OSACs are committees that will write proposed
standards documents and submit them to the ASB. But so can anyone else.
Anyone can submit a proposed standard to the ASB. Hence, perhaps, the
rethinking entailed by OSAC 2.0.
C. Implementation
Regardless of the composition of committees and the content of
standards, their enforcement and adoption is far from assured. Given all the
energy that was invested in the NCFS, it is shocking to realize how weak its
enforcement power was: non-binding recommendations to the Deputy
Attorney General to require things of DOJ laboratories only. It had no power
whatsoever over laboratories in other jurisdictions, where most forensic
science still occurs.
Sociologists of standards note that “the power of standardization
depends on whether standards are actually implemented.”56 One might adapt
for standards the old adage about academic articles: most are never cited;
many are never read. Likewise, “[c]ountless standards do nothing.”57
Sociologists point out that “the world is awash in competing standards,” and,
therefore, “standards risk remaining paper tigers unless they are widely
adopted.”58 They add that “[t]he voluntary nature of many standards makes
it difficult to develop momentum unless built-in incentives promote
compliance.”59
These incentives might range from government
requirements to peer pressure—a “crowd effect.”60 It is possible to imagine
both of these incentives having an effect on forensic science—governments
requiring crime laboratories to conform to standards, or crime laboratories
conforming to standards because most of their peers do—but it is at least
equally possible that these incentives are not effective.
Thus, even if the OSAC standardization process goes well,
implementation is an open question. Sociologists note that “[s]tandards
often require an auxiliary system that provides internal or external
incentives, audits, and certification. Standards may fail implementation for
countless reasons, including lack of knowledge, lack of compliance,
immediate conversion of standards, resistance, adaptation, or usurpation.
Very few standards work as intended by the designers of standards because
they are tinkered with, whether slightly or fundamentally.”61 These may be
56
57
58
59
60
61

Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 79.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81.
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discouraging thoughts for those hopeful about the OSAC standards.
Of course, sociologists of standards point out that there are many ways
for standards to “succeed.” Some succeed entirely through persuasive, rather
than legal or market, force. Some succeed symbolically; no one really
follows the standards, but they change the conversation.62 Some, it is
claimed, succeed through their very flexibility, by being broad enough to
accommodate various and changing practices.63
Has NIST’s OSAC assembled just the right mix of scientific firepower,
practitioner buy-in, consumer pressure, government power, cultural change,
and persuasive force to be the entity that finally reforms forensic science?
We cannot yet know, but the task is daunting.

62
63

Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 82.
Timmermans & Epstein, supra note 30, at 81.

